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Abstract. The past few decades have seen a resurgence of reasoning techniques in artiﬁ-
cial intelligence involving both classical and non-classical logics. In his paper, “Multi-valued
Logics: A Uniform Approach to Reasoning in Artiﬁcial Intelligence”, Ginsberg has shown
that through the use of bilattices, several reasoning techniques can be uniﬁed under a single
framework. A bilattice is a structure that can be viewed as a class of truth values that can
accommodate incomplete and inconsistent information and in certain cases default infor-
mation. In bilattice theory, knowledge is ordered along two dimensions: truth/falsity and
certainty/uncertainty. By deﬁning the corresponding bilattices as truth spaces, Ginsberg has
shown that the same theorem prover can be used to simulate reasoning in ﬁrst order logic,
default logic, prioritized default logic and assumption truth maintenance system. Although
this is a signiﬁcant contribution, Ginsberg’s paper was lengthy and involved. This paper
summarizes some of the essential concepts and foundations of bilattice theory. Furthermore,
it discusses the connections of bilattice theory and several other existing multi-valued logics
such as the various three-valued logics and Belnap’s four-valued logic. It is noted that the set
of four truth values in Belnap’s logic form a lattice structure that is isomorphic to the simplest
bilattice. Subsequently, Fitting proposed a conﬂation operation that can be used to select sub-
sets of truth values from this and other bilattices. This method of selecting sub-sets of truth
values provides a means for identifying sub-logic in a bilattice.
Keywords: bilattices,commonsense reasoning, knowledge representation, multi-valued logic,
non-standard logic
1. Introduction
In the past few decades, many classical as well as non-classical techniques
for modeling the reasoning of intelligent systems have been proposed. For
example, various non-classical logics have been imported into artiﬁcial
intelligence to deal with areas of vagueness (Zadeh 1979) and incomplete
information (Etherington 1988). In his paper, “Multi-valued Logic: A
Uniform Approach to Reasoning in Artiﬁcial Intelligence”, Ginsberg (1988)
presented a framework for unifying several existing formalisms of logical
reasoning in artiﬁcial intelligence. The general idea is that by labeling logical
statements with multiple truth values, the corresponding truth spaces (or220 KWANG MONG SIM
bookkeeping information) for various kinds of reasoning can be deﬁned and
subsumed under a single framework. In (Ginsberg 1988), the mathematics
that deﬁned this framework were very lengthy, involved and not easily
understood. The contributions of this paper are to summarize some of the
essential mathematical foundations in (Ginsberg 1988) and to relate some of
the interesting properties of the framework to multi-valued logics (Rescher
1969) (see section 2) and logics that deals with incomplete, inconsistent and
default information.
Incomplete information. Intelligent systems require the ability to reason
with incomplete information (Etherington 1988). This is because in the real
world complete information is hard to come by even in the most contrived
situation. For instance, in computer vision, an agent (possibly a robot) must
be able to cope with partial information concerning the orientation, shapes,
and types of objects it perceives. Thus, even though the agent is able to
abstract information from the environment, it may fall into a state of partial
ignorance. On this account, it is suggested (Turner 1984, pp. 37–38) that
some form of three-valued logic is required to model the behaviors of such
an agent. Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 described representative examples of
three-valued logics due to Lukasiewicz (1920), Bochvar (1939) and Kleene
(1952) respectively.
Inconsistent information. In multi-agent reasoning, an agent often has to deal
with information coming from different sources (or other agents). Under
such circumstances, inconsistencies may arise because information that an
agent receives from different agents may not always agree. For instance,
in the medical domain, several experts may have different opinions about
certain disease. In Belnap (1975) a four-valued logic which can be used by
computers to perform deductions on inconsistent information was proposed.
Belnap’s logic is presented in section 2.4. In other applications, an agent may
need to have the capabilities of restoring consistency. The work of Doyle’s
(1979) truth maintenance systems and de Kleer’s (1986) assumptions truth
maintenance systems (ATMS) addressed this issue (see section 3.5 for a brief
description of an ATMS bilattice).
Default information. The idea underlying most research in non-monotonic
reasoning is that of jumping to conclusions and making assumptions (Reiter
1987; Ginsberg 1987). In this context, a plausible conclusion can be derived
from a knowledge base in the absence of information to the contrary.T h e
information that is derived is defeasible because in light of new informa-
tion it may be defeated. Thus, any such conclusion can only be construedCONCEPTS AND FOUNDATIONS 221
as default information. Much of the work in non-monotonic reasoning (for
example circumscription, default logic,a n dautoepistemic logic) were due to
McCarthy (1980, 1986), Reiter (1990) and Moore (1985a). A brief exposition
of default logic in a bilattice setting will be given in section 3.3.
2. Multi-Valued Logic
2.1. Lukasiewicz’ three-valued logic
Lukasiewicz (1920) proposed a three-valued logic. In his logic L3,
Lukasiewicz introduced a third truth value I which can be construed as “inter-
mediate” or “neutral” or “indeterminate”. The interpretation of I stems from
the Aristotelian idea of a “future contingency” statement. Such a statement
has truth status that is neither true nor false. For instance, one can assume
(quite safely) that his/her presence at a certain place ten years from now can
neither be determined positively nor negatively at this moment. Hence, it is
only possible but not necessary that the above will be true.
In L3, the three truth values T, I and F are ordered in terms of decreasing
truthfulness,t h a ti sT > I > F. Consequently, a conjunction (respectively
disjunction) will be assigned the “falsest” (respectively the “truest”) truth
value of its components. The truth table for the propositional connectives
of L3 is given in Table 1. In L3, : and  are taken as primitives subjected to
the truth table given in Table 1. The other three connectives _, ^ and  are
deﬁned in terms of : and ; with p _ q for (p  q)  q, p ^ q for :(:p ^
:q)a n dp  q for (p  q) ^ (q  p). One of the interesting features of L3 is
that not all two-valued tautologies are valid. For example, the thesis (p _: p)
(sometimes known as the law of excluded middle) is not valid in L3 because
when p is assigned the truth value I,( p _: p) will also be labeled as I.
2.2. Bochvar’s three-valued logic
Another enthusiastic advocate of three-valued logic is Bochvar (1939). In
Bochvar’s logic B3, I is interpreted not as “intermediate” but as paradoxical
or meaningless. The motivating consideration of I in B3 is to cope with para-
doxical sentences. An example of a paradoxical sentence is “this sentence is
false” (If it is true then is must be false; if it is false then the sentence is true).
In B3 such a sentence is interpreted as meaningless.
Another deviation from Lukasiewicz’s logic is that the presence of an I-
valued conjunct forces the entire conjunction be assigned the truth value I.
Negation is deﬁned as in L3.I nB3, both : and ^ are taken as primitives and
subject to the truth table in Table 2. The other three connectives _,  and 222 KWANG MONG SIM
Table 1. Lukasiewicz’ three-valued connectives
p :pp ^ qp _ qp  qp  q
p q T IF T IF T IF T IF aa a
TF T TI FTTTTI FTI F
II I IIF T IIT T IIT I
FT F FFFTI FTTTFI T
are deﬁned in terms of : and ^ with p _ q for :(:p ^: q), p  q for :(p
^: q)a n dp  q for (p  q) ^ (q  p). Also, it is noted that two-valued
tautologies such as :(p ^: p)a n d( p  p) are not valid in B3 because both
formulas take the value I when p does.
2.3. Kleene’s (strong and weak) three-valued logic
Beside Lukasiewicz and Bochvar, Kleene (1952) has also developed a
three-valued logic K3.I nK3, I is introduced for epistemological rather
than ontological (fact-related) reasons. Here I is construed as “unknown”,
“indeterminable” or “undecided” and its purpose is to signify a state of partial
ignorance. The motivation of K3 is that undecidable mathematical state-
ments can be smoothly accommodated. For instance, given the mathematical
function P(x)i f f1 / x  1f o r0 x  2, P(x) may be deﬁned as follows:
P(x) D
8
<
:
I if x D 0,
T if 0 < x  1
F otherwise
There are however, two sets of connectives called strong and weak connec-
tives. The strong connectives :, ^,a n d_ are deﬁned as in L3 (Table 1). The
principal difference between strong K3 and L3 is that in strong K3, p  p
is not a tautology since p  q is deﬁned by :p _ q. Thus, for strong K3, p
 p = :p _ p is assigned I when p does so. In L3, p  p assumes T when
p is assigned I. In addition, p  p is also not a tautology in strong K3.T h e
truth table for Kleene’s strong connectives is given in Table 3 and the truth
table for the weak connectives is similar to that of B3 given in Table 2. Weak
connectives are characterized by the feature that a formula (an output truth
value) is assigned the value I when any of its components (input truth values)
takes the value I.CONCEPTS AND FOUNDATIONS 223
Table 2. Bochvar’s three-valued connectives
p :pp ^ qp _ qp  qp  q
p q TIFTIFTIFTIF aa a
TF T TIFTITTIFTIF
II I II III III III I
FT F FIFTIFTITFIT
Table 3. Kleene’s strong three-valued connectives
p :pp ^ qp _ qp  qp  q
p q TI FTI FTI FTIF aa a
TF T TI FTTTTI FTIF
II I IIF T IIT IIII I
FT F FFFTI FTTTFIT
2.4. Belnap’s four-valued (lattice-valued) logic
Belnap’s (1975) work on many-valued logic has been applied to question-
answering systems. His four-valued logic stems from his earlier work in
relevant logic (Anderson and Belnap 1975) and the logic of questions (Belnap
and Steel 1976). He argued that sophisticated question-answering machines
having the capability of making inferences from their data base should
employ a four-valued logic. The motivating consideration is that minor incon-
sistencies in their data should not be allowed to lead to irrelevant conclusions.
In his approach, any sentence can be assigned one of the four values chosen
from the set 4 ={ true, false, None, Both} (sometimes written as 4 ={ { t}, {f},
{} ,{ t, f}}). None represents that a sentence is neither true nor false; Both
represents that a sentence is both true and false.
Belnap noticed that there are two ways of forming a lattice structure using
4.O n ew a yi st oh a v eBoth at the top, None at the bottom, and true and
false as incomparable points in between forming an approximation lattice
A4 (shown in Figure 1). An approximation lattice (Scott 1970a, 1972, 1973)
is a complete lattice having (arbitrary) meet \ and (arbitrary) joint [ and a
partial ordering a. In addition, a negation operation : is deﬁned such that
:{}={ t, f}, :{f}={ t}, :{t}={ f}a n d:{t, f} = { } (Belnap 1975). In
addition, there is a non-mathematical interpretation for x a y that reads “x
approximates y”. Thus, one may identify an approximate real number with an224 KWANG MONG SIM
interval. For example, let x =[ x l,x u]a n dy =[ y l,y u], and x a y if xl a yl and
yu a xu.
The other way is to have true on top, false on the bottom and Both and
None as incomparable points in between forming a logical lattice L4 (shown
in Figure 2). L4 is also a complete lattice with its own meet ^, joint _ and
partial order l together with a negation operation : deﬁned in the usual
sense.
L4 and relevance logic. While A4 rests heavily on Scott’s semantics of
programming languages, L4 stems from Anderson and Belnap’s (1975) work
on relevance logic. Valuations in relevance logic (called set-ups) map atomic
sentences to truth values selected from the set 4. Relevance logic deals with a
relationship between pairs of sentences called tautological entailment. Thus,
given a pair of sentences  and ,  is said to entail  if for each set-up s, s()
l s(). The set of axioms and rules of inference for tautological entailment
(Anderson and Belnap 1975, pp. 158–159) are given as follows:
(R1)  : : 
(R2)  ^    ^ 
(R3)  _    _ 
(R4)  ^ ( ^ γ)  ( ^ ) ^ γ
(R5)  _ ( _ γ)  ( _ ) _ γ
(R6)  ^ ( _ γ)  ( ^ ) _ ( ^ γ)
(R7)  _ ( ^ γ)  ( _ ) ^ ( _ γ)
(R8) :( _ ) :  ^: 
(R9) :( ^ ) :  _: 
(R10)   ( _ )
(R11)   ( _ )
(R12) From (  γ)a n d(   γ), infer ( _ )  γ
(R13)  ^   
(R14)  ^   
(R15) From (  )a n d(   γ), infer   ( ^ γ)CONCEPTS AND FOUNDATIONS 225
Figure 1. A4: an approximation lattice.
Figure 2. L4: a logical lattice.
2.5. Sandewall’s lattice-valued logic
Beside Belnap, other researchers such as Sandewall (1985) have also
developed a lattice-valued logic. His approach is to order truth values based
on the completeness of the information they represent instead of truth or
falsity. To describe this idea, he introduces the partial order relation k.I n
his approach, truth values are subsets of the unit interval [0,1], the truth value
indicating that the probability of the statement in question is known to lie
somewhere in the associated probability interval. Using this interpretation of
truth values, when one learns more about some statement, the increase in
knowledge about the statement is reﬂected in a contraction of the interval of
possible probabilities assigned to it. This may be compared with the example
on intervals on approximation lattices given in section 2.4 where the interval
x contains the interval y since x a y.
The work of Sandewall together with Belnap’s logical lattice and Scott’s
approximation lattice provided the impetus for the development of bilattice
theory.226 KWANG MONG SIM
3. Ginsberg’s Bilattice Theory
Bilattice theory due to Ginsberg (1987a, 1988) is a ramiﬁcation of multi-
valued logic. A bilattice is a product of two lattices. It is a structure that
can be viewed as a class of truth value spaces that can accommodate incom-
plete and inconsistent information (Fitting 1991) and in certain cases default
information (Ginsberg 1988).
The fundamental concept of the bilattice approach is that logical state-
ments should be labeled with truth values selected from a set larger than just
a pair corresponding to deﬁnitely true and deﬁnitely false. The motivating
consideration of bilattice theory is that formal structures that can capture
bookkeeping information for various forms of reasoning can be deﬁned. This
is based on the realization that labels used for bookkeeping should capture
two kinds of information: the degree of truth/falsity of a given statement (for
example true, true by default) and the level of certainty/uncertainty about the
statement (for example known, assumed by default, unknown).
3.1. Bilattice deﬁnition
A bilattice is a set equipped with two partial orderings t and k.G i v e nt w o
truth values x and y,i fx t y then y is at least as true as x. The two opera-
tions corresponding to t are the greatest lower bound ^ and the least upper
bound _.F o rt h ek-partial ordering, if x k y then the evidence underlying
an assignment of the truth value x is subsumed by the evidence underlying
an assignment of the truth value y. In other words, y labels a sentence about
which one has more knowledge than a sentence labeled with x. The two oper-
ations  and ⊗ correspond to the least upper bound (lubk) and the greatest
lower bound (glbk) respectively in the k-ordering.  and ⊗ are sometimes
called the gullability and the consensus operators (Fitting 1993). Addition-
ally, there is a unary negation operator that inverts the sense of the t-partial
ordering while leaving the k -partial ordering unchanged. If x t y, then one
will expect that :y t :x. Thus, given two sentences p and q,i fp is more
true than q, then one expects the negation of p to be more false (or less true)
than the negation of q. Negation is less transparent in the k-partial ordering. If
x k y then it follows that :x k :y. That is, if one knows less about p than
about q then one knows less about the negation of p than about the negation of
q. As in propositional logic, the negation operator in a bilattice also requires
that ::x = x.CONCEPTS AND FOUNDATIONS 227
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Ginsberg 1988): A bilattice is deﬁned as a sextuple {B, ^, _,
⊗, , :} such that:
(1) The t-lattice {B, ^, _}a n dt h ek-lattice {B, ⊗, } are both complete
lattices.
(2) ::B! B is a mapping with:
(a) :2 =1 ,a n d
(b) : is a lattice homomorphism from {B, ^, _} to {B, _, ^} and {B,
⊗, } to itself.
Generalization. Ginsberg has proven that the bilattice framework subsumes
several existing formalisms in knowledge representation. In particular, he has
deﬁned bilattices for ﬁrst order logic (section 3.2), default logic (section 3.3),
prioritized default logic and assumption-based truth maintenance systems
(de Kleer 1986). The result from this formulation is that several forms of
reasoning can be performed using the same general purpose theorem prover,
differing only in the choice of the corresponding bilattice. Additionally, the
notions ofaworld-based bilattice (section 3.4) and anATMSbilattice (section
3.5) have also been considered.
3.2. A bilattice for ﬁrst order logic
A four point bilattice B4 i ss h o w ni nF i g u r e3w h e r e? indicates that no
information is available (a sentence is neither true nor false) and > indicates
that a sentence is both true and false. In (Ginsberg 1988), it was noted that
B4 corresponds to ﬁrst-order logic. Graphically, negation corresponds to a
reﬂection around the k-axis (joining ? and >). In fact, in any bilattice the
following lemmas (proven in Ginsberg (1988)) hold:
Lemma 3.1 (Ginsberg 1988): In any bilattice :t = f and :f = t.
Proof:S i n c et is the maximal element under t, it follows that :t is the
minimal element under t (negation reverses the sense of the t partial order),
so that :t = f. Similarly for :f = t.
Lemma 3.2 (Ginsberg 1988): In any non-trivial bilattice B, t and f are k-
incomparable.
Proof:I ff k t, then it follows that :f k :t a n db yl e m m a3 . 1 ,t k f.T h i s
would mean that t = f and B would be trivial. 
While lemma 3.1 shows that neither t nor f subsumes the information corre-
sponding to each other, lemma 3.2 shows that B4 is the smallest non-trivial228 KWANG MONG SIM
Figure 3. B4: the smallest non-trivial bilattice.
bilattice (the smallest (trivial) lattice being asingle point in which the bilattice
operations map the point to itself).
The four elements of the lattice shown in Figure 3 correspond to the
maximal and minimal elements under the two partial orders. All bilattices
will have these four distinguished elements.
Construction. One of the possible ways to construct a bilattice is by taking
the product of two lattices. More speciﬁcally, given two lattices {L1, ^1, _1}
and {L2, ^2, _2} a bilattice structure L1 2 L2 ={ L 1  L2, ^, _, ⊗, , :}
can be deﬁned such that for all hx1,x 2i, hy1,y 2i2L1  L2:
hx1,x 2i^h y1,y 2i = hx1 ^1 y1,x 2 _2 y2i
hx1,x 2i_h y1,y 2i = hx1 _1 y1,x 2 ^2 y2i
hx1,x 2i⊗h y1,y 2i = hx1 ^1 y1,x 2 ^2 y2i
hx1,x 2ih y1,y 2i = hx1 _1 y1,x 2 _2 y2i
:hx1,x 2i = hx2,x 1i
B4 can be constructed by taking the product of the lattice {L, ^0, _0}a n d
itself (where L = {t, f} with t ^0 f = f and t _0 f = t). Thus, B4 ={ L L, ^,
_, ⊗, , :}w h e r eL L={ ? = hf, fi, f = hf, ti, t = ht, fi, > = ht, ti} with
hf, fi^h t, ti = hf ^0 t, f _0 ti = hf, ti; hf, fi_h t, ti = hf _0 t, f ^0 ti = ht, fi;
and similarly for the other combinations pairs/operations. Consequently, it is
easily seen that Belnap’s logical lattice L4 and Scott’s approximation lattice
A4 are isomorphic to the t-lattice {L  L, ^, _}a n dt h ek-lattice {L  L, ⊗,
}o fB4 respectively (with ? corresponding to None and > corresponding
to Both).CONCEPTS AND FOUNDATIONS 229
Figure 4. BD1: a bilattice for default logic.
3.3. Bilattices for default logic
The idea of a default logic and a prioritized default logic may also be
represented in bilattice theory. A bilattice for default logic (Reiter 1990) is
shown in Figure 4. In addition to t, f, ? and >, a sentence can also be labeled
with dt (true by default) or df (false by default); * = dt  df indicates that a
sentence is both true and false by default, which is different from ? and >.
It is clear that *, dt,a n ddf correspond to some sort of default information
while t, f, ? or > correspond to certain information. Just as in the case of the
bilattice for ﬁrst order logic, negation in a default bilattice also corresponds
to a reﬂection around the ?-> axis.
A bilattice for prioritized default logic. A bilattice for a (“second order”)
prioritized default logic is shown in Figure 5. This is an extension of the
bilattice for default logic (shown in Figure 4). The point ? is expanded
to reﬂect the existence of a “second order default”. This idea can also be
extended to handle an arbitrary number of “levels” or “orders” of defaults
such as those presented in Etherington and Reiter (1983) and Shoham (1986);
and according to Ginsberg, the “levels” of defaults are not assumed be
discrete.230 KWANG MONG SIM
Figure 5. BD2: a prioritized default bilattice.
3.4. World-based bilattices
Beside considering a bilattice interpretation for default logic, one can also
adopt a bilattice interpretation for possible worlds. One class of bilattices
called world-based bilattices can be obtained by considering a collection of
worlds.
A world-based bilattice Bw is formed by a set of possible worlds W,b y
letting (U, V) be a pair of subsets of W. Then, given a sentence , the truth
assignment ()=( U, V) means that  is true in the worlds of U and false in
the worlds of V. Additionally, the intersection of U and V need not be empty;
the union of U and V need not be equal to W. Consequently, it follows that
the four maximal/minimal elements of a world-based bilattice can be written
as: ? =( , ), t =( W, ), f =( , W), > =( W, W).
Given two sentences  and , with truth values (U1, V1)a n d( U2, V2)
respectively, the two partial orderings t and k can be deﬁned as (Ginsberg
1988):
(tBw)(U1, V1) t (U2, V2)i f fU2  U1 and V1  V2,
(kBw)(U1, V1) k (U2, V2)i f fU2  U1 and V2  V1.
(tBw) says that  is less true than  if  is less frequently true than 
and false at least asfrequently. (kBw)can be construed as saying that moreisCONCEPTS AND FOUNDATIONS 231
known about  than  if  is true whenever  is and false whenever  is. The
ﬁve operations associated with the k and t partial orders are as follows:
(^Bw)( U1, V1) ^ (U2, V2)=( U1 \ U2, V1 [ V2)
(_Bw)( U1, V1) _ (U2, V2)=( U1 [ U2, V1 \ V2)
(⊗Bw)( U1, V1) ⊗ (U2, V2)=( U1 \ U2, V1 \ V2)
(Bw)( U1, V1)  (U2, V2)=( U1 [ U2, V1 [ V2)
(:Bw) :(U1, V1)=( V1, U1)
It is interesting to note that if there is only one world in W then a world-based
bilattice collapses to the simplest non-trivial bilattice B4 given in Figure 3. In
addition, it is noted (Fitting 1989) that Bw can be associated with a general-
ized Kripke structure (this is described in section 4.1). Also, it is noteworthy
to mention that the idea of a world-based bilattice can also be adopted as a
bookkeeping mechanism for an assumption-based truth maintenance system
(Ginsberg 1988).
3.5. ATMS (Assumption-based Truth Maintenance System) bilattice
Like a world-based bilattice, a truth value in an ATMS bilattice BA is a
pair [JT, JF]w h e r eJT and JF are justiﬁcations for the truth and falsity of
a sentence respectively (Ginsberg 1988). In an ATMS, the justiﬁcations
associated with any sentence is a list of contexts in which the sentence is
valid. Each context c consists of a list of sentences 0 and c is characterized
by 0. For instance, let  be some statement such that  will hold if either
 holds or,  and  both hold. Thus, the list of contexts (the justiﬁcation)
for  is ((), (, )) and the context given by (, ) corresponds to the
set of situations in which the conjunction  ^  is valid. In this setting,
a justiﬁcation can be thought of as a collection of subsets of a given
propositional language L. More formally, the set of all justiﬁcations is
simply the power set of the power set of L.
Partial order on justiﬁcations. The set of all justiﬁcations may be partially
ordered. The “maximal” justiﬁcation ({ }) requires the fewest premises (a
sentence justiﬁed by ({ }) holds in any context) and the “minimal” justiﬁca-
tion being the empty set ( ) records no information about the context in which
a sentence holds. Thus, the maximal and minimal elements along the two
partial orderings are given as: ? = [( ), ( )], t = [({ }), ( )], f =[ () ,( {} ) ] ,> =
[({ }), ({ })]. Partial ordering on justiﬁcations can be deﬁned as follows. Let
ja and jb be two justiﬁcations where the list of contexts of ja is (a1,...,a n)
and the list of contexts of jb is (b1,...,b m). If ja  jb then every conjunctive
sub-clause in ja contains some sub-clause in jb as a subset. More formally,232 KWANG MONG SIM
(a1,...a n)  (b1,...,b m) if for each ai, there is some bj such that ai  bj.
Consequently, partial ordering in BA can be given as:
(tBA)[ j aka] t [jbkb]i f fj a  jb and ka  kb
(kBA)[ j aka] k [jbkb]i f fj a  jb and ka  kb
4. Fitting’s Bilattice Theory
Fitting (1987, 1989, 1991, 1993) has considered several variations of bilattice
theory. He introduced a more restricted class of bilattices called interlaced
bilattice (section 4.2) and proposed that a world-based bilattice can be
adopted as the space of truth values for a generalized Kripke model.
4.1. Generalized Kripke models
Given a ﬁrst order language FL, a generalized Kripke model (Fitting 1989) is
a tuple (W, R, jD, Dj)w h e r eW is a set of possible worlds, R i sab i n a r y
relation on W,a n djD and Dj are support relations such that for all s 2
W, sjD means  holds at s and sDj means  fails at s. In addition, the
following conditions are satisﬁed:
(:T) sjD: iff sj6D
(:F) sDj: iff s6Dj
(^T) sjD ^  iff sjD and sjD
(^F) sDj ^  iff sDj or sDj
(_T) sjD _  iff sjD or sjD
(_F) sDj _  iff sDj and sDj
(8T) sjD8'(x) iff 8d 2 D ) sjD'(d)
(8F) sDj8'(x) iff 8d 2 D ^ sDj'(d)
(9T) sjD9'(x) iff 9d 2 D ^ sjD'(d)
(9F) sDj9'(x) iff 8d 2 D ) sDj'(d)
where D is the domain of quantiﬁcation for each world of the Kripke model.
(T) sjD iff 8ts Rt ) tjD
(F) sDj iff 9ts Rt ^ tDj
(T) sjD iff 9ts Rt ^ tjD
(F) sDj iff 8ts Rt ) tDj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Consequently, a truth value relative to a generalized Kripke structure is a pair
hT, Fi = h{sjsjD}, {sjsDj}i. The operations :, ^,a n d_ are deﬁned as in
section 3.4. The only new deﬁnitions are the operations of  and  which are
given as follows:
(Bw) hT, Fi = h{sj8ts Rt ) tjD}, {sj9ts Rt ^ t Dj}i
(Bw) hT, Fi = h{sj9ts Rt ^ tjD}, {sj8ts Rt ) t Dj}i
Also, the k and t partial orderings for truth values are deﬁned as in section
3.4.
4.2. Interlaced Bilattice and Conﬂation
Fitting (1991) argued that the notion of a bilattice provides a simple and
elegant setting for distributed logic programming where incomplete or
inconsistent answers may arise. In this platform, bilattices are viewed as a
family of truth-value spaces that can elegantly accommodate this missing or
conﬂicting information. However, to provide a semantics for distributed logic
programming, he requires a more restricted notion of (Ginsberg’s) bilattice
called an interlaced bilattice (Fitting 1989, 1991, 1993).
Deﬁnition4.2(Fitting 1991): Aninterlaced bilattice isaset Bwithtwopartial
orderings t and k such that:
(1) each of t and k gives B the structure of a complete lattice.
(2) the meet and the join operators for each partial ordering are monotone
with respect to the other ordering.
Condition (1) is similar to those of Ginsberg’s, presented in section 3.1.
Condition (2) states that both the t-ordering and the k-ordering are meet-
preserving and joint-preserving. For example, in the t-ordering, if a t b
and c t dt h e na^ c t b ^ d; also a k ba n dck di m p l ya^ c k b
^ d. This is also true for the other operations/ordering combinations. This
monotone (order-preserving) property is called the interlacing condition. It is
noted (Fitting 1991) that not every bilattice satisﬁes this interlacing condition.
For instance, the bilattice for default logic BD1 presented in section 3.3 is not
interlaced. This can be veriﬁed as follows:
From Figure 4, f t df (and * t * )b u ti ti snot the case that f ⊗ * t df ⊗
*. Since f ⊗ *=*a n ddf ⊗ *=df it follows that df ⊗ * t f ⊗ * because
df t *.
Examples of bilattices that are interlaced include B4 and BW. The fact
that B4 is an interlaced bilattice follows directly from proposition 1.234 KWANG MONG SIM
Proposition 1 (Fitting 1991): In any interlaced bilattice:
(1) t ⊗ = ?; t  f = >.
(2) >^?= f; >_?= t,
Proposition 1 (ﬁrst proven in (Fitting 1991, pp. 96–97)) is proved again in the
appendix of this paper.
To show that BW is interlaced is to show that it satisﬁes the mono-
tone property for all the operations/ordering combinations. Only the ^/k
combination is presented here; the other operations/ordering combinations
are similar. Let (Ua, Va), (Ub, Vb), (Uc, Vc)a n d( Ud, Vd) be truth values such
that (Ua, Va) k (Ub, Vb)a n d( Uc, Vc) k (Ud, Vd). Thus, it follows that Ub
 Ua, Vb  Va, Ud  Uc and Vd  Vc. The purpose is to show that (Ua, Va)
^ (Uc, Vc) k (Ub, Vb) ^ (Ud, Vd).
There are two possible cases:
(1) Suppose that (Ub, Vb) k (Uc, Vc). Then, it follows that Ud  Uc  Ub
 Ua and Vd  Vc  Vb  Va. Thus, (Ua, Va) ^ (Uc, Vc)=( Ua \ Uc,
Va [ Vc)=( Ua, Vc)a n d( Ub, Vb) ^ (Ud, Vd)=( Ub \ Ud, Vb [ Vd)=
(Ub, Vd). Since (Ua, Vc) k (Ub, Vd), it follows that (Ua, Va) ^ (Uc, Vc)
k (Ub, Vb) ^ (Ud, Vd).
(2) Suppose that (Ud, Vd) k (Ua, Va). Then, it follows that Ub  Ua  Ud
 Uc and Vb  Va  Vd  Vc. Thus, (Ua, Va) ^ (Uc, Vc)=( Uc, Va) k
(Ub, Vb) ^ (Ud, Vd)=( Ud, Vb)
Conﬂation. In addition to the operations of bilattices described in section
3, Fitting (1989, 1991, 1993) has also considered another operation called
conﬂation. Conﬂation is a dual of negation, it inverts the sense of the k-partial
ordering and leaves the t-partial ordering unchanged.
Deﬁnition 4.3 (Fitting 1991): An interlaced bilattice B has a conﬂation
operation if there is a mapping: B ! B such that:
(1) x t y )− x t −y
(2) x k y )− y k −x
(3) −−x = x
Examples of bilattices that have a conﬂation operation include B4 and BW
described in sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.4. This can be checked as follows:
For B4: This follows directly from proposition 2 (proven in (Fitting 1991,
p. 99))
For BW:L e t( U1, V1)a n d( U2, V2)b ee l e m e n t si nBW. Then, −(U1, V1)
=( −V1, −U1)w h e r e−U1 and −V1 are complements of U1 and V1 respec-CONCEPTS AND FOUNDATIONS 235
tively. Similarly −(U2, V2)=( −V2, −U2). Suppose that (U1, V1) t (U2, V2)
then U2  U1 and V1  V2, but by contraposition, −U1 − U2 and −V2
− V1. Thus, −(U1, V1) t −(U2, V2), satisfying condition (1) in deﬁnition
4.3. For condition (2), suppose that (U1, V1)k (U2, V2)th enU2 U1 and V2
 V1 and by contraposition −U1 − U2 and −V1 − V2. Thus, it follows
that −(U2, V2) k −(U1, V1). Also, it is clear that −−(U1, V1)=−(−V1,
−U1)=( −−U1, −−V1) which satisﬁes condition (3).
Proposition 2 (Fitting 1991): In any interlaced bilattice with conﬂation,
(1) −? = >; −> = ?
(2) −t = t; −f = f
The proof of proposition 2 is given in the appendix.
It is noted (Fitting 1991) that not every bilattice has a conﬂation. For
example, the bilattices B6 shown in Figure 6 do not have a conﬂation
operation. If B6 has a conﬂation, the behavior on ?, f, t,a n d> are
determined by proposition 2. Thus, only −a and −b need to be checked.
If −a = ? then by deﬁnition 4.3, (3), a = −−a = −? = > which is not
the case. Similarly, f, t,a n d> are ruled out as possible values for −a,
leaving only either −a = a or −a = b. Both of these are not possible
because by deﬁnition 4.3, (2) a k f implies −f k −a, but having −a =
a means that f k a which is not the case (Figure 6). If −a = b then −f
=f k −a = b which is impossible since f and b are incomparable (Figure 6).
Selecting sub-logics. The primary purpose of the conﬂation operation is to
distinguish subsets of truth values in an interlaced bilattice. This may be
made more explicit with the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 4.4 (Fitting 1989): In an interlaced bilattice with conﬂation, for x
2 B
(1) x is exact if x = −x
(2) x is consistent if x k −x
For B4: It is easily seen that the set {t, f} satisﬁes condition (1) of deﬁnition
4.4, while the set {t, f, ?} satisﬁes condition (2), since t k −t, f k −f,
and ? k −? = >. Thus, exact truth values and consistent truth values in
B4 are exactly those in classical logic and Kleene’s strong three-valued logic
(described in section 2.3) respectively.
For BW:( U, V) is consistent if U \ V =  and exact if U and V are
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Figure 6. B6: an interlaced bilattice.
5. Summary and Discussion
This paper has shown the mathematical constructions of Ginsberg’s bilattice
and Fitting’s interlaced bilattce. While Ginsberg’s default and world-based
bilattices provided the mathematical foundations for supporting the construc-
tions ofprioritized default reasoning and assumption-based truth maintenance
systems respectively, interlaced bilattices allow subsets of multiple truth
values to be identiﬁed. For example, in Belnaps’s four-valued logic, classical
two-valued logic and three-valued logics due to Lukasiewicz, Bochvar and
Kleene can be identiﬁed. All these logics extend the set {true, false} by
adding a third truth valued I. Lukasiewicz’s interpretation of I stems from
the Aristotelian idea of a “future contingency” statement. In his logic, I is
construed as “intermediate”, “neutral” or “indeterminate”. Bochvar, however,
interpreted I as paradoxical or meaningless. In Kleene’s logic, I is introduced
for epistemological rather than ontological (fact-related) reasons. Thus, I
is interpreted as “unknown”, “indeterminable” or “undecided” in Kleene’s
system.
Subsequently, Belnap has added a fourth truth value to Lukasiewicz’s
three valued logic. Both Belnap and Scott noticed that there are two ways
of forming a lattice structure using the four truth values {true, false, None,
Both}. One way is to have Both at the top, None at the bottom, and true and
false as incomparable points in between forming an approximation lattice
A4. The other way is to have None on top, Both on the bottom and true and
false as incomparable points in between forming a logical lattice L4.B o t hA4CONCEPTS AND FOUNDATIONS 237
and L4 are complete lattices each having its own meet and joint and a partial
ordering. While A4 stems from Scott’s semantics of programming languages,
L4 rests on Anderson and Belnap’s work on relevance logic.
Like Belnap, Sandewall has also developed a lattice-valued logic. His
approach however, is to order truth values based on the completeness of the
information represented by unit intervals instead of truth or falsity. In this
approach, truth values are subsets of the interval [0,1]. Under this interpreta-
tion the increase in knowledge about a statement is reﬂected in a contraction
of its associated interval.
The work of Sandewall together with Belnap’s logical lattice and Scott’s
approximation lattice provided important impetus for the development of
Ginsberg’s bilattice theory. A bilattice is a product of two lattices. It is a
structure that can be viewed as a class of truth value spaces that can accom-
modate incomplete and inconsistent information and in certain cases default
information. In bilattice theory, sentences are ordered along two dimen-
sions: degree of truth/falsity (for example true, true by default)a n dl e v e lo f
certainty/uncertainty (for example known, assumed by default, unknown).
Themotivating consideration ofbilattice theory isthat mathematical struc-
tures that capture bookkeeping information for several types of inference
can be deﬁned. In fact, one of the novel features of bilattice theory is that
it subsumes several existing formalisms in knowledge representation. For
instance, Ginsberg has deﬁned bilattices for ﬁrst order logic, default logic,
prioritized default logic and assumption-based truth maintenance systems. In
addition, it can be seen that A4 and L4 are isomorphic to the k and t lattice of
the simplest non-trivial bilattice.
Furthermore, Fitting has shown that a semantics for distributed logic
programming (where incomplete or inconsistent answers may arise) may
be deﬁned relative to interlaced bilattices. He added the conﬂation opera-
tion which is used to distinguish subsets of truth values in an interlaced
bilattice. For example, when applied to the simplest non-trivial bilattice,
conﬂation identiﬁes exact truth values in classical logic and consistent truth
values in Kleene’s strong three-valued logic. In particular, conﬂation provides
an algebraic formulation of the connections that exist among two-valued,
three-valued and four-valued semantics for logic programming.
6. Conclusion
This paper has highlighted some of the novel features of bilattice theory and
its connections with other multi-valued logics. Ginsberg’s (1988) paper on
bilattice theory was very long, detailed and involved. However, it is noted
that bilattice theory provides a unifying framework that ties together the238 KWANG MONG SIM
common threads of several existing formalisms in knowledge representation
and reasoning; this is indeed a signiﬁcant contribution. It is hoped that this
paper can serve as an introduction for understanding the basic foundations of
bilattice theory.
In addition, it is emphasized that although the logics discussed in this
paper suggest the idea of non-dichotomous truth values, this paper adopts
an epistemic (rather than an ontic) interpretation in viewing inconsistent (and
incomplete) information. In the Tarskian sense, a sentence can only be either
true or false. It is only when dealing with beliefs of agents that the possibility
of inconsistent (and incomplete) information be considered. In Sim (1994,
1995) for example, a multi-valued epistemic logic for reasoning about the
degree of belief of agents was considered.
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Appendix
In this appendix, the proofs for propositions 1 and 2 in section 4.2 are given. Both
the propositions are restated here for convenience.
Proposition 2.1 (Fitting 1991): In any interlaced bilattice:
(1) t ⊗ f = ? ; t  f = >.
(2) >^?= f; >_?= t,
Proof: Only the case for t ⊗ f = ? is given. The other cases are analogous. To prove
t ⊗ f = ? , it is sufﬁcient to establish the two inequalities:
(1) ? t t ⊗ f
(2) t ⊗ f t ?
(1): For all elements b in an interlaced bilattice, it can be seen that ?⊗b = ?.A l s o ,
since t is the greatest element under t, ? t t , the interlacing condition requires
that ?⊗b t t ⊗ b. Letting b = f, it follows that ? = ?⊗f t t ⊗ f.
(2): In the other direction, it is noted that f t ?; and again by the interlacing
condition, b ⊗ f t b ⊗? ,f o ra l lb. Then, letting b = t, it follows that t ⊗ f t t ⊗?
= ?. CONCEPTS AND FOUNDATIONS 239
Proposition 2.2 (Fitting 1991): In any interlaced bilattice with conﬂation,
(1) −? = >; −> = ?
(2) −t = t; −f = f
Proof:
(1): Since ? k b for any b in an interlaced bilattice, it follows that ? k −>,a n d
by deﬁnition 4.3, (2) (in p. 21), > k −?; but since > is the greatest element under
k, it follows that > = −?. Then by deﬁnition 4.3, (3), −> = −−?= ?.
(2): Since b t t for any b in an interlaced bilattice, it follows from the deﬁnition
of ^ that b ^ t = b for any b. Letting b = −t, it follows that −t = −t ^ t = −t ^− (−t)
= −(t ^− t)=−(−t)=t. Similarly for −f = f.
Note: −t ^−(−t)=−(t ^−t) followsfrompropositionA1, (1),givenasfollows.
Proposition A1 (Fitting 1991): In an interlaced bilattice B with conﬂation,
(1) −^A = ^−A, −(a ^ b)=( −a ^− b)
(2) −_A = _−A, −(a _ b)=( −a _− b)
(3) −5A = 6−A, −(a ⊗ b)=( −a − b)
(4) −6A = 5−A, −(a  b)=( −a ⊗− b)
where ^, _ , 5 and 6 are arbitrary meet and arbitrary join in the t and k ordering
respectively and A is a subset of the set of all elements in B.
Proof: Only the proof for (1) and (3) are given, the other cases are similar.
(1): Let −A ={ −aja 2 A}. Since for all a 2 A, ^ A t a, it follows by deﬁnition
4.3, (1) (in p. 21) that −A t −a. From this it follows that −^ A t ^ (−A). For
the converse, let a 2 A and −a 2− A,a n ds o^ (−A) t −a. From this and from
deﬁnition 4.3, (1), it follows that −^(−A) t a, and hence −^ (−A) t ^ A and so
^ (−A) t −^ A.
(3): Let −A ={ −aja 2 A}. Since for all a 2 A, 5A k a, it follows by deﬁnition
4.3, (2) that −a k −5A and hence 6(−A) k −5A. For the converse, let a 2
A and −a 2− A,a n ds o−a k 6(−A). From this and from deﬁnition 4.3, (2), it
follows that −6(−A) k a, and hence −6(−A) k 5A and so −5A k 6(−A).
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